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The Instructional Information Processing Account of
Digital Computation / Nir Fresco & Marty Wolf
*

Abstract. What is nontrivial digital computation? It is the processing of discrete data through discrete
state transitions in accordance with finite instructional information. The motivation for our account is
that many previous attempts to answer this question are inadequate, and also that this account accords
with the common intuition that digital computation is a type of information processing. We use the
notion of reachability in a graph to defend this characterization in memory-based systems and
underscore the importance of instructional information for digital computation. We argue that our
account evaluates positively against adequacy criteria for accounts of computation.

1. Introduction
What is computation? At first blush, this question may seem trivial and uninteresting.
The Turing machine (TM) is a widely accepted model of digital computation that is
often used to ascertain whether a specific physical phenomenon is computational1.
Finite computation in a TM is defined as a fixed mapping from inputs to
corresponding outputs. The TM is used for defining computability, universality and
computational complexity. Why then should we bother with this question?
The problem of characterizing computation is far from being trivial. To
complicate matters we commonly find claims such as:
● “[Natural] cognition is a type of computation” (Pylyshyn 1984, xiii).
● “Every ordinary open system is a realization of every abstract finite
automaton” (Putnam 1988, 121).
● “[T]he universe computes” (Lloyd 2006, 3).
But what does it mean to assert that cognition, every ordinary open system or the
universe computes? Besides, if everything computes, then what computation means
does not seem to matter.
*
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The subtle distinction between x being computable and x being computational is not further discussed
here.
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The TM model is insufficient for ascertaining whether some systems are
computational. A finite state automaton (FSA) differs from the TM, since its input
tape is not bidirectional, infinite or writable. Yet, the FSA is regularly used to solve
computational problems. Even the modern digital computer does not have anything
that corresponds to the TM’s infinite tape. Furthermore, newer computational models
such as quantum computers, relativistic computers, hypercomputers, connectionist
networks, evolutionary computers and molecular computers are not necessarily
compatible with the standard TM model. Do they all perform the same type of
computation? If not, do they have something in common or are they completely
distinct?
Even in the realm of computational cognitive science, it is far from clear what
computation means. Very few accounts provide plausible explanations of this
phenomenon. We highlight two plausible accounts in Section 5. Some inadequate
accounts, which are motivated by finding a bridge between computation and
mentality, presuppose that computational states are individuated in the same way that
mental states are. However, this presupposition faces problems (removed-foranonymity-1 2013). The present account does not share this presupposition.
To highlight additional problems inadequate accounts face, we briefly consider
the physical symbol systems (PSS) account and the formal symbol manipulation
(FSM) account. On the PSS account, a computational system is a physical symbol
system that contains sets of interpretable and combinable symbols and a set of
processes that operate on symbolic expressions by generating, copying, modifying,
combining and destroying them according to instructions (Newell and Simon 1976,
116). On the FSM account, a computational system is a physical automatic formal
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system, the states of which are identified as symbols, that manipulates symbols
according to its own rules (Haugeland 1985, 76).
The FSM and PSS accounts are problematic in many respects. Lack of space
permits only two brief remarks. First, both these accounts are grounded in symbolic
computation and promote external semantics as the center of digital computation. “A
computational process is one whose behavior is viewed as depending on the
representational or semantic content of its states” (Pylyshyn 1984, 74). Second,
despite their similarities they are extensionally different accounts, because they
denote different classes of computational systems. The class of computational systems
denoted by the PSS account only includes programmable stored-program universal
computers. The FSM account classifies a broader range of computational systems,
including for example, specific-purpose TMs. Both accounts exclude physical
implementations of FSAs, flip-flops 2 and discrete connectionist networks. The
resulting classes are too narrow, as they exclude too many paradigmatic digital
computational systems (removed-for-anonymity-1 forthcoming-a).
It is generally assumed that digital computation can be freely defined as
information processing. However, the truth of the claim that digital computation is
information processing can only be ascertained once the precise notion of information
is fixed. In removed-for-anonymity-1 (2012) and Piccinini and Scarantino (2011)
various notions of information are examined as the basis for understanding
computation as information processing. In this paper, we propose “instructional
information”3 as the correct notion that gives rise to the instructional information
processing (IIP) account of computation. According to our account, nontrivial digital
2

Flip-flops are basic memory cells. A flip-flop is a bistable element with a clock input. Its state
changes only in response to a clock edge, say, when the clock signal rises from 0 to 1 (Harris and
Harris 2013, 108).
3
This notion is defined and explicated in the next section.
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computation is the processing of discrete data through discrete4 state transitions in
accordance with finite instructional information. Unlike other accounts of
computation that are either too narrow or too broad, the IIP account has the right
scope. It classifies CPUs, TMs, conventional digital computers, flip-flops and FSAs
as nontrivial computational systems, whilst classifying chairs, digestive systems and
walls as non-computational. Since it also does not posit the individuation of
computational states in the same way that mental states are individuated, it is a
plausible basis for a computational theory of cognition.5
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the notions of data, semantic
content and instructional information are defined and analyzed. In Section 3, we use
the technique of reachability in a graph to motivate the IIP account by analyzing
memory-based nontrivial computational systems. In Section 4, we explicate the IIP
account by analyzing both memory-based and memoryless computation. In Section 5,
we claim that the IIP account is adequate and improves on two plausible accounts of
digital computation: the algorithm execution account and the mechanistic account. In
Section 6, we show a positive evaluation of the IIP account against adequacy criteria
for accounts of computation. Section 7 concludes the discussion and identifies
directions for future work.

2. Instructional Information - Definitions and Preliminaries
Let us begin with two basic definitions of data and semantic information that are
needed for explicating the notion of instructional information, which underpins the
IIP account.

4
5

In this paper the property of being discrete - or digital - implies having sharp and distinct boundaries.
The evaluation of this last claim remains a task for further work.
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Definition 1. A datum d is the lack of uniformity between at least two uninterpreted
variables that are distinct from one another in a domain that is left open to further
interpretation (Floridi 2011, 85).

Definition 2. An object O is an instance of semantic information, understood as
semantic content, iff:
1

It consists of n data D (n ∈ N+).

2

D are well formed.

3

D are meaningful independently of their recipient (Floridi 2010, 21).

Semantic content requires fixing the conventions of the communication in some
way so that data have the meaning we want them to have. Both well-formedness and
meaningfulness appeal to something outside pure data (be that abstract or physical).
The first requirement of Definition 2 is of positive data and is self-explanatory. The
second requirement is that the data be structured according to some rules. A common
conception of rules is the syntax rules for a language. Data can also be structured via
physical characteristics of the system, such as the grouping of nucleotides to form
codons in DNA. The first two requirements give rise to the simplest form of
information: structured data. The addition of the third requirement yields semantic
content. It only requires that structured data comply with the semantics of the system
or code in question.
For the present analysis, we adopt Luciano Floridi’s data based definition of
semantic content. Floridi’s theory of strongly semantic information that is founded on
the above definitions (2011, chap. 5) is undoubtedly not problem-free. One of its key
problems is the tenet that the underlying data have to be veridical for semantic
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content to qualify as genuine semantic information (i.e., factual information) (cf.
Fetzer 2004; Scarantino and Piccinini 2010). It might even be argued that there are
other well-developed theories of entropy that seem more adequate for the analysis of
the interaction between information and computation, such as Gibbs entropy,
Shannon information and algorithmic information (Adriaans 2010, 44–45). However,
elsewhere, the first author has argued that, at least, Shannon information and
algorithmic information are not up to the task of explaining digital computation, for
they lack the conceptual richness to capture the notion of instructional information
(removed-for-anonymity-1 2012). These two conceptions are insensitive to the
meaningfulness of data. It is certainly possible that the central definition of
instructional information may be reformulated using Gibbs entropy, Shannon
information or algorithmic information. However, it remains to be seen how such
reformulation can be accomplished.
Another concern is that it may appear that our formulation of the IIP account
yields a circular definition of computation, due to the second requirement of
Definition 2. In computer science well-formedness is often defined by using a notion
of computation that appeals to an automaton accepting a class of strings.6 If that were
always the case, then our account of computation would itself depend on a notion of
computation. 7 However, examination of two common forms of computation
demonstrates that well-formedness is generated by the organization of the system.
We consider both an abstract and a physical computational system. First, the wellformedness of the data in the TM is determined by the definition of TMs. The input
data are restricted to certain forms in tape cells according to certain rules. The well6

We thank an anonymous reviewer for identifying this potential conundrum.
Incidentally, in passing it should be noted that, at least prima facie, using algorithmic information as
an alternative to semantic content in our context inevitably yields a circular definition of computation.
For algorithmic information is defined in terms of computational programs.
7

6

formedness in this case emerges from the positioning of the individual datum in the
proper place on the tape. Given their abstract nature, each datum approaches Floridi’s
notion of data de re (2011, 85 ff). Second, the structure of data in a conventional
digital computer comes from the physical organization of the system. Wires and flipflops are organized in a particular order. It is that organization of the physical carriers
of electrical signals as data de signo (Floridi 2011, 86) that structures the data. In both
of these cases, and others, the structure of the data may be obtained from the
organization of the system concerned, rather than through some computational
requirement. This also shows that being structured is not an inherent ontological
quality of data.
Semantic content can give rise to factual information (Floridi 2011, 103ff) and to
instructional information. By Floridi’s lights, for semantic content to qualify as
factual information it also has to be veridical. However, instructional information
cannot be qualified as true or false, for it is intended to make something happen. In
this sense, it escapes the problems faced by factual information. The correctness and
lack of ambiguity of the semantic content8, rather than its veridicality, contribute to
yielding the right state of affairs when instructional information is processed. The
three requirements of semantic content are necessary conditions for instructional
information, but they need to be supplemented by a sufficient condition.9 This gap is
filled by the following definition.

8

If the semantic content is incorrect, by following it reliably the expected outcome is unlikely to be
obtained. If it is correct but ambiguous, it is impossible to follow reliably, for there are at least two
courses of possible action.
9
Strictly, Floridi considers another type of instructional information that is based on what he calls
“environmental information”. Environmental information is conveyed by data that might be
meaningful independently of an intelligent producer (Floridi 2010, 32). This type of information is
distinguished from semantic content. In this paper, we confine our discussion to instructional
information as a subtype of semantic content. We make another observation regarding environmental
information below in the context of analyzing Boolean gates.

7

Definition 3. Semantic content is an instance of instructional information iff its
satisfaction yields a definitive action in a given context.

Instructional information is prescriptive rather than descriptive. The debate over
the nature of imperatives, the core of instructional information, is unsettled.
Definition 3 accords with other classifications of imperatives. “An imperative [...]
expresses an immediate demand for action but that does not describe a fact: an
imperative is satisfied if we have the result of an agent’s action” (Ross 1941, 54).
“[T]he kernel [...] of the imperative [is] the action [...] that the imperative enjoins”
(Hamblin 1987, 45). “[I]mperatives convey requirements [...] for action or
prescriptions of actions” (Pérez-Ramírez and Fox 2003, 55). Adopting Charles
Hamblin’s Action State Semantics model whereby a world is a series of states
connected by events10, allows the identification of those worlds in which a given
imperative is satisfied in some set of states (Reed and Norman 2007, 417). The
imperative “Close the window!” is satisfied in those worlds in which the window is
closed given the right conditions. There exists a triple relation Pre→[α]Post, where
“Pre” are pre-conditions and “Post” are post-conditions, that establishes the
correctness of the action (α) performed. Action α is correct if it is possible to perform
it when the pre-conditions are satisfied with respect to the state concerned (PérezRamírez and Fox 2003, 45, 59).
It is worth noting that instructional information can also be expressed either
negatively or positively. In English, for example, the construction of a negative
imperative typically differs from the positive one by the presence of some negative
quantifier, e.g., “Don’t close the window!”. This type of construction is found in some
10

Events are of two types: deeds, performed by specific agents, and happenings, which are world
effects (Reed and Norman 2007, 417).
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natural languages, but constitutes a minority overall (cf. Miestamo and Auwera 2007).
In a general form, a negative imperative can be expressed as <prohibitive,
prohibition> (Kaufmann 2012, 9). Importantly, for our present purposes, a prohibitive
still yields a definitive action and is occasionally used in computational systems. NOP
or NOOP, shorthand for no operation, instructs the computational system to do
nothing. It is found in assembly language, high-level programming languages (e.g., an
empty block statement “{}” in C or the pass statement in Python) and computer
protocol commands. It is often used to synchronize operations.
Thus characterized, instructional information cannot rise to the level of factual
information. An instruction, regardless of whether it is actualized as the satisfaction of
semantic content in the right context, is neither true nor false. Also, instructional
information need not necessarily be utilized. A washing machine user manual that
specifies the order in which to set the dials contains instructional information even in
the absence of an agent with the capacity to do so. This is a case of an unfulfilled
instruction, rather than inaccurate or false description.
An important implication of Definition 3 for the IIP account is the necessity of a
system having the capacity to carry out the action. A capacity is an inherent action
that a system, either abstract or physical, can reliably and predictably execute. A
system (or an agent) processes instructional information when, in general, it has at
least two capacities.
Instructional information is conveyed either conditionally or unconditionally. We
briefly examine how instructional information is used conditionally and
unconditionally in computer programming. Consider the following simple code
excerpt for calculating the average value of a set of integers.
def calcAverageValueOfList(inputList):
if inputList:
9

sumOfValues = 0
for number in inputList:
sumOfValues += number
return float(sumOfValues) / len(inputList)
else:
return
Code excerpt 1. Computer code that calculates the average of the integer values of an input
list.

How is instructional information conveyed by the statements above?
● “if inputList” - If the condition is true, “inputList” is not empty, the statements
that follow it are executed. Whereas, “else” represents the alternative path.
● “for number in inputList” - This for statement iterates over the elements in the
list “inputList”. The imperative character of this instruction is enabled by the
inherent conditional that evaluates positively if there is at least one more
element in the list.
● “sumOfValues += number” - This incremental assignment statement is an
unconditional imperative that adds the value of the current element of
“inputList” to the variable “sumOfValues”.
We note that function calls, such as “len(inputList)”, are equally describable as
instructional information. In general, any function call is an imperative, since it
directs the assignment of arguments to parameters and the execution of a specific
body of code.
By way of concluding this section, we introduce three abbreviations for ease of
exposition in the ensuing discussion. “Data” can denote unstructured data, structured
data or semantic content.
● Let D stand for discrete data simpliciter in the broadest form. Any instance of
D simply complies with Definition 1.

10

● Let ud stand for unstructured discrete data. Any instance of ud is an instance
of D that satisfies only the first requirement of Definition 2 (i.e., being
nonempty data).
● Let sd stand for structured discrete data. Any instance of sd is an instance of D
that satisfies at least the first two requirements of Definition 2 (i.e., being
nonempty and well-formed data).
The sets of all possible ud and sd are disjoint and their union is the total set of D.

3. Nontrivial Computational Systems and Reachability in a
Graph
In this section, we develop a theoretical structure that helps in answering our main
question, “What is computation?”. In particular, we analyze paradigmatic abstract
computational systems and identify instructional information as an essential
component of any notion of nontrivial computation. To proceed, we review some
work by Pieter Adriaans and Peter van Emde Boas in which they develop the notion
of meta-computational space for TMs (2011). Following that we turn our focus to
memory models and adapt their notion to establish the concept of a generalized metacomputational space for analyzing all memory-based nontrivial computational
systems. We include a very simple example to help concretize these concepts.
There are three views of TMs as computational systems that are helpful here: a
specific TM computing on some specific input, a specific TM (not confined to a
specific input), and the simultaneous consideration of all possible TMs. The most
straightforward is the case of a specific TM computing on some specific input.
Adriaans and van Emde Boas define an Instantaneous Description (ID) to include a
description of the entire tape contents, the position of the tape symbol currently being
scanned and the current state of the TM (the reader is referred to (Adriaans and van
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Emde Boas 2011) for complete details). For our purposes, an ID describes a specific
memory configuration of a particular TM. Adriaans and van Emde Boas also define
the notion of a configuration graph. In this graph, every possible ID for a particular
TM is mapped to a vertex of the graph and a directed edge is added to the graph from
vertex with IDi to the vertex with IDj iff the configuration specified by IDj follows
from IDi via a single move (i.e., a capacity) of the TM. A valid computation of the
TM corresponds to a path between any two such vertices in the corresponding
configuration graph. A path that starts at ID0, the unique ID representing the starting
configuration of the TM, and continues through the graph to any vertex that contains
an ID with the halt state corresponds to an accepting computation of the TM. The last
notion adopted from Adriaans and van Emde Boas is that of a meta-computational
space, which is the disjunct sum of all the configuration graphs for a given
enumeration of TMs.
Next we make two adaptations to these concepts. As defined, the notion of metacomputational space applies only to TMs. Since our aim is analyzing systems for any
memory model, we use the notion meta-computational space to refer to the disjunct
sum of all of the configuration graphs for a given enumeration of systems over a fixed
memory model. Our second adaptation stems from the observation that in a metacomputational space, there is nothing that guarantees that all edges are present. In
fact, in the case of TMs, it is quite clear that many edges are not present due to the
definitional restriction on TMs that requires the read/write head to move at most one
tape cell in a single move. Thus, the meta-computational space generated by a given
enumeration of TMs is not as general as possible. We use generalized metacomputational space to capture the notion of adding all of the edges to a metacomputational space.

12

Definition 4. A generalized meta-computational space for a given metacomputational space is the complete directed graph, including self-loops, on the
vertex set of the meta-computational space.

Generalized meta-computational spaces are graphs based upon the memory model
present in the system under consideration. We use the term reachability graph (RG)
to refer to any subgraph of a generalized meta-computational space. Each RG is a
possibly infinite graph where each vertex represents a specific memory configuration
of the system, and an edge represents a capacity of that system to move from one
memory configuration to another. For the simple example shown in fig. 1, we have a
system with a 2-bit memory model 11 . Thus, there are four possible memory
configurations and hence, vertices in the RG. In the generalized meta-computational
space there are no restrictions on the edges. That is, the system has the capacity to
move from any one configuration of the two bits to any other.

Figure 1. Generalized meta-computational space for 2-bit memory system.

11

It should be noted that a generalized meta-computational space with a richer memory model can be
used to model any system with a simpler. For example, the generalized meta-computational space
associated with TMs can be used to model the systems shown in fig. 1 and fig. 2. The advantage gained
by considering different generalized meta-computational spaces is a clearer taxonomy of computational
systems as is shown in Section 6.
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Note that every computational system on two bits is a subgraph of this RG. The
example illustrated in fig. 2, representing a 2-bit shift left register, is based on the
same memory model, but as a computational system has a restricted set of capacities.

Figure 2. The meta-computational space for a 2-bit shift left register.

The notion of generalized meta-computational space removes the restrictions
imposed by a specific computational system and gives a clearer picture of
computation in memory-based systems. We argue that memory-based nontrivial
computation, construed as the processing of data through discrete state transitions
according to instructional information, is defined completely in terms of reachability
in a generalized meta-computational space. Thus, instructional information provides
the basis for understanding computation.
Our approach, then, begins by fixing a memory model that in turn yields a
generalized meta-computational space. At this point, it is possible to structure a
variety of different computational systems and classes of computational systems over
the generalized meta-computational space by placing restrictions on the capacities of
systems. In the case of the class of all TMs, restrictions include things such as the
read/write head can move at most one cell to either the left or the right, the input is in
the lowest numbered cells and so on. These restrictions on capacities, in turn, place
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restrictions on edges in the RG. For example, the read/write head restriction implies
that there can only be an edge between two vertices when the integers representing
the head locations differ by either zero or one. Implicit in the definition of a TM is the
requirement that the position of the head be ignored in the application of a move. In
turn, this forces a single move of a specific TM to appear as infinitely many edges in
an RG, even when the RG is a configuration graph.
Defining computational systems in this way, we have a uniform approach in which
the memory model is identified, restrictions on capacities are specified, and edges,
representing capacities, are included in the RG12. A computation in the RG begins at
any vertex and ends at any other vertex. A system, abstract or physical, that supports
the underlying memory model and has the requisite capacities, implements that
computation by processing the specific instructional information that actualizes those
very same capacities.
An obvious shortcoming of the RG approach thus described is its lack of
applicability to memoryless systems. However, it is clear that instructional
information plays a key role in memory-based computation. To address this
shortcoming, our focus changes in the next section to explicate the IIP account,
analyze memoryless systems and discuss nontrivial computation at greater length.

4. Fleshing Out the IIP Account
In the previous section, we have developed an abstract notion of memory-based
nontrivial computation. This description clearly delineates capacities within a system
from the instructions whose satisfaction yields the activation of those capacities. In
this section, we extend the use of the capacity/instruction distinction to motivate the
12

This approach allows for descriptions of capacities to potentially be infinite. While infinite
descriptions may not be particularly useful, they do not impact the finiteness requirement of
instructional information.
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IIP account in physical systems and explain both memory-based and memoryless
computation in a uniform way.
According to the IIP account, nontrivial computation is the processing of discrete
data through discrete state transitions in accordance with finite instructional
information. Trivial computational systems process D, which need not be structured,
by way of exercising the single capacity of the system. Nontrivial computational
systems, on the other hand, process instructional information by way of being capable
of processing at least two distinct instructions for the corresponding capacities.
The instructions processed are either conditional or unconditional relative to the
particular chosen level of abstraction13 (LoA). In computer science, abstraction is the
process of identifying objects, properties and interrelationships that arguably hold the
essence of the computational system considered (van Leeuwen forthcoming). Some
nontrivial computational systems clearly process conditional instructions. Conditional
statements are common in programming languages (cf. code excerpt 1) and so a
computer that executes a program typically also processes conditional instructions.
Other nontrivial computational systems, such as certain flip-flops, only process
unconditional instructions to exercise their capacities. Analysis of computational
systems on the IIP account also requires consideration of the system’s memory model.
We separately consider computational systems that are memory-based and
memoryless.

13

Floridi defines an LoA as an object of study (e.g., a system) that consists of a finite, non-empty set
of observables, which are interpreted typed variables (2011, 52). A typed variable is a variable
qualified to hold only some declared kind of data. In this context, ‘interpreted’ means that the typed
variable represents some feature of the system under consideration. Note that an analysis that relies on
the data being structured should proceed using moderated LoAs. For more on LoAs see Floridi (2011,
chap. 3). In the context of computational objects, higher and lower LoAs interrelate. The interpretation
of an LoA in terms of the lower LoA remains of utmost importance and the interface among LoAs is
also crucial (van Leeuwen forthcoming). See (van Leeuwen forthcoming) for a discussion of the
differences between the usage of LoAs in computer science and the method described by Floridi.
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In memory-based nontrivial computational systems, the memory model accounts
for which unconditional instruction is to be executed next. The execution of a
conditional typically requires a change from one memory configuration to another in
the RG (or back to itself via a self-loop). A computational system has the capacity to
perform certain operations conditionally. Unconditional instructions, and possibly
other D, trigger the execution of conditional capacities. 14 The condition p→q is
merely shorthand for ¬p q. The truth tables for both statements are equivalent, but
only the former explicitly represents a conditional. In other words, whether the
instruction to be processed is conditional or unconditional in relative to a particular
LoA. This also shows how specific organizations of trivial computational systems,
that is, primitive Boolean gates, give rise to nontrivial computational systems.
For all genuine computational systems what matters to their data processing is the
abstract form (i.e., type) of the processed D rather than the particular realization of the
D (i.e., token data). The same transformation of D may take place in a variety of
physical substrates (cf. a flip-flop implemented using rebounding water droplet
collisions in Mertaniemi et al. 2012). This is the root of the multiple realizability of
algorithms and data. An algorithm may be implemented in different programming
languages and on different physical architectures. Multiple realizability of D is
reflected both in Definition 1 - the matter of the implementation of D is left
undetermined and in the articulation of RGs in that the nature of the instruction that
activates a particular capacity is quite naturally left unspecified.

14

It can also be argued that, in some sense, every imperative can be expressed as a conditional. For
example, “do X” can be expressed as “do X unless there is some exceptional circumstance”. The
“exceptional circumstance” serves as a sanction imposed on the normal course of action. Still, this is
the modus operandi of physical computational systems. The system computes as long as there is no
failure.
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This brings us to the relationship between abstract computation and the physical
system that implements it. Any abstract computation (performed by, say, a TM, an
FSA or a cellular automaton) is reducible to atomic operations over individual pieces
of data, which can, but need not, be symbols. In accordance with Definition 1, data
can be either abstract or physical. In a TM, data are implemented as symbols on its
tape and as states of the finite control and head positions. These data may in turn be
implemented as magnetic polarity changes (or as patterns of physical pits on a platter)
and as electrical voltages, respectively, in a conventional digital computer. Below we
give examples of physical computational systems in which ud and sd are physically
realized.
On our account, the delineations between computational systems and noncomputational systems, and between trivial and nontrivial computational systems
depend on the input D, the processing of D, the output D and whether the systems in
question have memory. Memory-based computational systems are grouped as classes
of systems based on a shared memory model and capacities. However, memoryless
computational systems are analyzed on the basis of whether and how they structure
data. A NOT-gate, which has only one capacity, does not have the same capacity as
any two-input, one-output Boolean gate. Each of the next two sections focuses on a
particular class of computational systems.
4.1. Non-Computation and Computation in Memoryless Systems
Our first distinction is between computational and non-computational systems. If for
any input D the system does not always produce the same output D (i.e., different
inputs potentially cause different outputs), the system computes. For example, the
input ud an AND-gate receives affects the output ud the AND-gate sends. Only (1,1)
as input causes a logical 1 as output. Thus, the AND-gate computes, for it does not
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always produce the same output. Conversely, if a system always produces the same
output D irrespective of the received input D, then that system does not compute. We
return to non-computational systems later.
The next distinction to be drawn is among memoryless computational systems.
This class consists of two subclasses: all memoryless trivial computational systems
and all memoryless nontrivial computational systems. The subclass of memoryless
trivial computational systems in turn consists of two further subclasses: those systems
operating on ud as input and those systems operating on sd as input.

Figure 3. The class of memoryless trivial computational systems is the union of two disjoint subclasses:
those operating on ud and those operating on sd.

Memoryless trivial computational systems (see fig. 3) include physical systems
such as two-input, one-output Boolean gates, the NOT-gate, half adders, full adders,
and n-bit adders. There are similar abstract computational systems, such as logical
conjunction and the three place Boolean function that produces both the sum and
carry of adding those three bits. The NOT-gate and most two-input, one-output
Boolean gates15 belong to the subclass of systems operating on ud. Swapping the
15

There are four two-input, one-output Boolean functions that operate on sd, including the function
defined by the following four 3-tuples: (0,0,0); (0,1,0); (1,0,1); (1,1,0). The first two bits are the inputs
and the last one is the output bit. The inputs (0,1) and (1,0) clearly show that the order of D matters (in
contrast to, say, an OR-gate).
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order of the input lines of, say, an AND-gate does not change its output: both (0,1)
and (1,0) lead to the same output.
We consider two different perspectives on the AND-gate. In the first, the inputs are
treated as ud, that is, neither bit plays any special role in the function computed. The
output is determined by the gate’s physical capacity that follows the rules of the
logical conjunction operation. Note that viewed from this perspective, there is no
notion of an instruction, since the inputs are unstructured. It is also clear that there is
no need for an instruction as the system has precisely one capacity. This system
performs its single capacity whenever ud are present as input. Alternatively, the input
can be viewed as sd, with one bit identified as the control bit carrying instructional
information. The capacity of the AND-gate can be expressed as: if the control bit is a
1, the datum bit is the result; otherwise 0 is the result.
Why is the first perspective of the AND-gate more appropriate for the explanation
of its operation? In the AND-gate there is no functional distinction between the datum
input bit and the control bit. It does not matter whether the first one is treated as a
datum or as an instruction. Attributing one bit the role of D and the other the role of
control can be done arbitrarily ex post facto. In general, structure may be attributed to
any ud. This is due to the structure of data not being an inherent ontological quality of
data. Yet here, promoting ud to sd is done arbitrarily.
The observation that the AND-gate and similar Boolean gates process ud and not
sd has two important implications. The first implication is related to Floridi’s
classification of some instructional information as environmental information (cf. fn.
9). He argues that “the logic gates in the motherboard of a computer merely channel
the electric voltage, […interpretable] in terms of instructional information […] such
as ‘if . . . then’. In this case, there is no semantics involved at the level of the gates”.
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Here, our present analysis diverges from Floridi’s in that Boolean gates are not
viewed as processing instructional information. They have a single capacity. This also
brings us to the second implication. Even if an AND-gate processes semantic content,
that semantic content would not satisfy Definition 3. For the operation of an ANDgate cannot be reasonably described as following an imperative. “[T]he characteristic
purpose of imperatives is to influence choice. It is futile to tell [...] anyone to do
something [...] he cannot help doing” (Hamblin 1987, 145). The AND-gate simply
does what it “should” by design thereby exercising its only capacity in the presence of
ud. “[A] forced action is not really an action; […] the agent complies [...] with some
persuasive force” (Hamblin 1987, 146, italics added).
A full adder is more complex in design than an AND-gate. This circuit has three
inputs and two outputs and a single capacity. While the standard description of a full
adder suggests that the three inputs are structured, a simple analysis of the behavior of
the full adder indicates that they are not. Since the three input bits are ud, a full adder
ought to be categorized similarly to the AND-gate.
An n-bit adder belongs to the subclass of memoryless trivial computational
systems operating on sd. Its input is structured: the zeroth bits are separate from the
first bits and so on. It is, therefore, more computationally powerful than, say, twoinput, one-output Boolean gates, yet, it only performs trivial computation. It has only
a single capacity. No instructional information is needed for its operation.
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Figure 4. The class of all memoryless computational systems is the union of two disjoint subclasses:
those processing instructional information (nontrivial & memoryless) and those that do not (trivial).

Multiplexers16 and multi-operation ALUs17 are examples of memoryless nontrivial
computational systems (see fig. 4). Systems in this subclass not only operate on sd as
input, but also process instructional information. Consider an ALU with two (or
more) capacities, say, addition and subtraction. Because it has more than one capacity
for possible action, it requires a control bit. There is a functional distinction between
the operands and the control bit. Therefore, the order of the bits in the operands
matters to the operation of the ALU. Note, however, that this ALU is memoryless.
While the ALU receives input sd, it performs either an addition or subtraction and
continues to do so until it receives different input sd or is powered off. A similar
analysis applies in the cases of other memoryless nontrivial computational systems

16

A multiplexer is a combinational circuit that is used to choose an output among several possible
inputs sd based on a value of a select signal (Harris and Harris 2013, 83).
17
An arithmetic logical unit (ALU) is an essential component of most CPUs. It combines a variety of
arithmetic and logical operations, such as addition, subtraction, conjunction and disjunction, into a
single unit (Harris and Harris 2013, 248).
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that structure data, including systems such as a three-input, one-output multiplexer
(Harris and Harris 2013, 83).
In sum, the dividing line between trivial and nontrivial computational systems is
drawn by the processing of instructional information (see fig. 5). Trivial
computational systems do not process instructional information, since they have only
one capacity. The processing of D, that need not be structured, is done through a
single action of the system by either the transformation from one type of D to another
(e.g., a NOT-gate) or the modification of D (e.g., a XOR-gate). Nontrivial
computational systems have at least two distinct capacities and are controlled by
instructional information.

Figure 5. The class of all computational systems is the union of two disjoint subclasses: trivial and
nontrivial computational systems. Only systems in the latter subclass process instructional information.

4.2. Nontrivial Computation in Memory-Based Systems
The principle of exercising control at the heart of the IIP account is already
manifested by multiplexers and multi-operation ALUs, and is even more conspicuous
in memory-based nontrivial computational systems, such as TMs (discussed in
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Section 3), FSAs, flip-flops and conventional digital computers. In general, for
memory-based computational systems, the memory model implies a structure to the D
it holds. At each step of a TM computation, the combination of the symbol read from
the tape (i.e., sd) and the state of a deterministic TM uniquely determines the capacity
to be exercised next. This combination is, therefore, instructional information, which
when processed actualizes a capacity of a TM to move from the current memory
configuration to another.
The FSA is another example of an abstract memory-based nontrivial computational
system. For it uses the underlying memory model of TMs and has the requisite
capacities for implementing computations by processing the specific instructional
information that actualizes those very same capacities. The main differences from the
TM come from the restricted set of capacities (and thus, the simpler RGs) that FSAs
are allowed. The contents of the FSA’s input tape remains unchanged, and the
position of the read-only head shifts only to the right by exactly one position. The key
point is that transitions of the FSA represent capacities the FSA has to move from one
memory configuration to another by processing instructional information. Since the
set of edges allowed in the RG for FSA is much smaller than the set of allowable
edges for TMs and the former can neither store nor delete arbitrary sd during its
operation, the former is less computationally powerful than the latter by the IIP
account.
The flip-flop is an example of a physical system related to the class of FSAs. The
generalized meta-computational space for a system with two Data flip-flops is the one
shown in fig. 1. There are four possible inputs (00, 01, 10, 11). Each of those is
instructional information with each meaning transition to the indicated state. When
the system processes any of the four instructions it actualizes its capacity to move
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from one memory configuration to another, thus processing sd through discrete state
transitions in accordance with finite instructional information.
4.3. Replies to Two Possible Objections
We consider two possible objections to our account. The first objection concerns the
case of systems computing the identity function. In Section 4.1 we characterize a
computational system as one in which different inputs potentially cause different
outputs. An apparent contradiction arises when a system S that computes the identity
function takes D as input and returns the same D as output.
Our reply addresses three different systems computing the identity function.
Simple mechanisms, such as delay gates, do not perform trivial computation. A delay
gate is analogous to a wire carrying a binary signal (electricity at one voltage or
another) where the same input D is simply produced as output D unchanged. The
emphasis is on the output being a simple “copy” of unchanged D. The second case
concerns a combinational circuit consisting of primitive Boolean gates organized in
such a way as to compute the identity function. One might argue that this is
problematic, since this combinational circuit, which should count as a memoryless
trivial computational system, does not compute. But this claim is misguided. For any
construction of such a circuit requires that the primitive Boolean gates process the
input D thereby transforming it before the overall output yielded is the same as the
input. The third case is resisting a similar claim that a TM that computes the identity
function is supposedly not computational. In this case the RG specification of this TM
shows that whist the same input sd is produced as output, the TM produces the output
by moving from one memory configuration to another.
The second objection considered is to our characterization of systems that always
produce the same output D irrespective of the input D as non-computational. Consider
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a TM that “ignores” its input sd or erases whatever input sd there is on the tape, sums
the numbers 1-9, writes 45 on the tape as output and halts. This TM “always”
produces 45 as output irrespective of the input. This shows, the objection continues,
that, on our account the TM does not compute, since for any input D it always
produces the same output D (i.e., 45). This concern is addressed by again considering
the RG of the TM. The erasure of a single input symbol represents a change in the
memory configuration. An instruction is required to actualize that capacity, thereby
meeting our characterization of computation.

5. An Improvement on Two Plausible Accounts
We now compare the IIP account with two plausible accounts of computation and
show how our account resembles them, and more importantly how it improves on
them. The IIP account resembles an account of digital computation in terms of
algorithm execution. Whilst, informally, an algorithm is an ordered sequence of
instructions to solve a particular problem, a more rigorous definition is problematic. A
sequential-time algorithm, for example, can be defined as a state transition system
that starts in an initial state and transitions from one state to the next until, if ever, it
halts or breaks. However, there are other types of algorithms that may not be similarly
defined, such as asynchronous parallel, distributed, real-time, hybrid and even
quantum algorithms (Gurevich 2012). This problem leads to the key advantage of the
IIP account over an explanation of computation in terms of algorithm execution.
For the sake of comparison, let us consider the algorithm execution account
proposed by Jack Copeland (1996). According to this account, a system S computes a
function F iff there exists a labeling scheme L and a formal specification of an
architecture (e.g., 2.7GHz quad-core Intel Core i5) and an algorithm specific to the
architecture (e.g., a mergesort algorithm written in machine language) that takes
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arguments of F as inputs and delivers values of F as outputs such that the pair (S, L) is
an honest model of that specification (Copeland 1996, 348)18. Our focus is limited to
the executed algorithm and the executing architecture.
Copeland defines an algorithm as a “finite set of instructions such that, for some
computing machine M, each instruction calls for one or more of M’s primitive
operations to be performed, either unconditionally or if certain conditions [...] are
met” (1997, 696). An algorithm ϕ being specific to an architecture ϴ implies not only
that a ϴ-type machine can run ϕ, but also that each instruction in ϕ calls explicitly
for the execution of some sequence of the primitive operations available in ϴ. If ϕ
called for multiplication on an ϴ-type machine that does not support multiplication as
a primitive operation, it would only be executed correctly provided that each
multiplication instruction in ϕ is replaced by, say, a series of addition instructions
(Copeland 1996, 337).
However, Copeland’s description is consistent with the notion of a program rather
than an algorithm. This leads to the undesirable consequence of computation being
the execution of programs, rather than algorithms. Consider any algorithm for adding
two positive n-digit numbers, such as the one that children learn in primary school.
Such an algorithm can be implemented in arbitrarily many ways using a specific
programming language and then compiled for a particular machine (converting the
algorithm into a program). No data types are imposed by the algorithm nor are any
limitations imposed by ϴ. However, on Copeland’s account, an algorithm is specific
to ϴ and that makes it a program.
On this account, computation amounts to program execution, but what about
computational systems that do not execute a program? Arguably, discrete
18

The reader is referred to (Copeland 1996) for complete details.
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connectionist networks do not execute programs. Yet, we contend that, on the IIP
account, these networks may be classified as computational systems. Recurrent
networks change their persistent state(s) in the course of computation and thereby
qualify as memory-based systems, whereas feedforward networks do not. Only some
feedforward networks operate on sd and require instructional information to single out
a particular capacity to be exercised; those qualify as nontrivial computational
systems. It also seems a stretch to describe a flip-flop as executing a program, in
accordance with Copeland’s account. On the IIP account, on the other hand, the flipflop is classified as computational. Importantly, if cognition (or at least part of it) is
indeed computational, but not in virtue of program execution, then the IIP account is
advantageous as a plausible basis for a computational theory of cognition.
We now turn to compare the IIP account and the mechanistic account, showing
how the former is an improvement over the latter. On the mechanistic account, digital
computation is the processing of strings of digits according to rules (Piccinini 2007a).
A “digit” is defined as a macroscopic state of a component of a computational system
(Piccinini and Scarantino 2011, 7).
We focus our analysis on the mechanistic “digit”. On the mechanistic account, a
large number of possible microscopic states correspond to each macroscopic statetype (Piccinini and Scarantino 2011, 7–8). On the IIP account, microscopic states,
such as [4V-5V] and [7V-8V], are viewed as D (e.g., representing 0 and 1 bits on the
input lines of an OR-gate). It may be argued that digits are D, but Gualtiero Piccinini
maintains that many computations “depend not only on an input string of data, but
also on the internal state of the […] mechanism” (2007a, 509). Data are distinguished
from states. He also argues that memory components in digital computers have the
dual function of storing macroscopic states and indicating the memory state upon
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request. “Their state constitutes either data strings or the physical implementation of
abstract internal state” (Piccinini 2007a, 514, italics added).
The mechanistic “rule” also highlights this distinction. “A rule [...] is simply a map
from input strings of digits, plus possibly internal states, to output strings of digits”
(Piccinini and Scarantino 2011, 8). This suggests that digital computation proceeds
from input D and possibly the internal states of the computational system to output D.
We conclude that mechanistic digits qualify as D. On the IIP account, internal states
of computational systems constitute sd at the appropriate LoA. For example, the
internal state of the TM’s controller and the input datum – that is, the scanned symbol
– play an equal role in determining the next move of the TM and together they qualify
as sd.
To what type of information do mechanistic digits rise? They are not just ud as can
be inferred from Piccinini’s emphasis on the ordering of digits (Piccinini 2007a, 515).
Since the ordering of digits matters, they are sd. Piccinini argues elsewhere that digits
“need not carry Shannon information at all [... and] strictly speaking, computing
systems need not process Shannon information” (Piccinini and Scarantino 2011, 27).
He also argues that digital computation need not be the processing of nonnatural (i.e.,
semantic) information, which is descriptive and representational. So, digits need not
carry nonnatural information (or be representations) (ibid, 30).
Do some digits qualify as instructional information? If digits are sd and the IIP
account is correct, it seems that the answer must be affirmative. This is where the
mechanistic “rule” comes into play. Since some digits act as input sd and others are
output sd, it makes sense that some digits encode the rules for processing input sd.
“Both data and instructions are physically instantiated as strings of digits, which
computers can manipulate” (Scarantino and Piccinini 2010, 326). Furthermore,
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Piccinini argues that “information” as employed in computer science is “non-truthevaluable” in a manner that corresponds with “instructional information”.
Accordingly, the same string of digits may play the role of either an instruction or
data at different times (Scarantino and Piccinini 2010, 325–326).
The IIP account employs a richer notion of data thereby allowing an explanation of
significantly more computational properties. Consider only those components of a
digital computer that require power to retain any D. They provide the memory model
for the system. Since for any given computer these components are finite in number,
they give rise to a finite number of different possible memory configurations in the
RG. The particular computer has certain capacities and as computation progresses the
computer uses instructional information to transition from one memory configuration
to another. This view of digital computers is found in a meta-computational space
generated over an enumeration of all FSAs.
Here the advantage of the IIP account is most apparent. On the mechanistic
account, FSAs are “so much less [computationally] powerful than ordinary digital
computers” (Piccinini 2007a, 506). However, if computers are basically large
complicated FSAs, the mechanistic account may not be effective at separating
complexity due to size (as is the case between FSAs and computers) from complexity
due to a particularly rich structure (as is the case between FSAs and TMs). The IIP
account does better here. As another example, we noted above that the right
combination of a NOT-gate and an OR-gate gives rise to a circuit with the capacity
enabling conditional instructions (cf. the first objection discussed in Section 4.3). In
contrast, primitive Boolean gates are trivial computational systems each with a single
capacity. Thus, we have a separation that is due to increasing complexity. We
conclude that the IIP account generalizes and improves on the mechanistic account.
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6. The IIP Account Evaluated
In this section we evaluate the adequacy of the IIP account. For simplicity, we adopt
Piccinini’s criteria (2007a) for this evaluation, since they are self-explanatory and
justifiable.
According to the first criterion, objectivity, whether a system is computational has
to be determined as a matter of fact. Unlike some authors who claim that
computational descriptions are vacuous (Putnam 1988; Searle 1990), we maintain that
computation is objectively identifiable relative to the appropriate LoA. Memorybased nontrivial computation is defined completely in terms of memory models,
capacities and reachability. Either the criteria for reachability are met or not. Any
adversary’s enthusiastic attempt to describe some arbitrary transitions of microscopic
states of some wall as nontrivial computation is faced with a challenge. If she claims
the wall to be a memoryless computational system, she has to show which
microscopic states are treated as input sd, what their structure is, what capacities the
wall has and by virtue of what instructional information they are actualized when
processed. If she claims the wall to be a memory-based computational system, she
also has to show what properties of the wall are used to define the IDs and edges of
the RG.
It may be objected that a conventional AND-gate, for example, could be just as
well described differently as an OR-gate when the standard interpretations of logical 0
and logical 1 are reversed (Shagrir 2001, 374). This supposedly shows that the
computational identity of the system is observer-relative. But it does not follow that
computation is observer-relative. Certainly, the underlying data processing capacity of
the AND-gate, for example, can be used in different ways, such as logical conjunction
or disjunction, giving rise to “different” computations relative to different LoAs. But,
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as suggested before, an analysis of computational systems in terms of the lower LoA
is of utmost importance (cf. fn. 13).
The point is that a semantic reinterpretation of the AND-gate’s operation as logical
disjunction at a higher LoA does not undermine the system being computational. The
information processing operation analyzed at the lower LoA is simply given another
name relative to some higher LoA. Logical disjunction may very well be called
conjunction instead, but it is still a computation. The “black box” does not change,
and the transformation of D it performs remains unchanged. The only change is how
the input and output D are interpreted. Besides, systematic reinterpretations are
relatively simple for trivial computations. But, more complex computations are harder
to systematically reinterpret as a different computation. The observer-relativity of
computation

is

discussed

at

length

elsewhere

(removed-for-anonymity-1

unpublished).
According to the second criterion, the right things compute, both abstract and
physical paradigmatic computational systems have to be classified as computational.
As shown above, abstract systems, including TMs and FSAs, are nontrivial
computational systems. So are multi-operation ALUs, multiplexers, flip-flops, CPUs
and conventional digital computers. Whilst primitive Boolean gates as well as some
combinational circuits (e.g., half- and full-adders and n-bit adders) are classified as
computational, they only perform trivial computations on our account.
According to the third criterion, the wrong things do not compute, paradigmatic
non-computational systems are classified as non-computational. Planetary systems,
digestive systems and walls do not perform computations on the IIP account. Planets
move along ellipses where they revolve around a larger object (a star) in accordance
with Kepler’s laws of planetary motion. But that does not amount to them processing
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instructional information. Any computational description applied to their planetary
motion may only be applied ex post facto. It is perhaps unsurprising that noncomputational systems may only be described computationally ex post facto. Just as
describing some physical object O by a system of equations does not imply that O is a
system of equations, describing O computationally does not imply that O is
computational (Piccinini 2007b, 99). Even if the processes of O are computable, it
does not follow that they are computational. The question is what gives such a
computational description explanatory force.
The explanatory force of this description is provided by the underlying
assumptions of this description. Even if we assumed that the elliptical movement of
some planet is the execution of an imperative instruction (whatever the instruction
and the input sd operated on are), to qualify as a nontrivial computation there needs to
be another distinct path the planet could move along that is a second capacity. At best,
a planetary motion may be described as a trivial computation. Consider the second
perspective offered in Section 4.1 on the operation of Boolean gates and the ascription
of structure to the input D processed by an AND-gate. Removing this complication
yields a simpler description. Occam’s razor demands this as the more appropriate
description.
According to the fourth criterion, miscomputation, physical computational systems
may fail to compute in the presence of noise. For memory-based systems,
miscomputation is explained by the IIP account through the notion of paths in RGs.
Making a transition from one vertex to another in the absence of an edge is a
miscomputation. When sd are mapped into physical states and physical computation
takes place on those physical states miscomputation may occur. It occurs when some
noise causes a physical system to transition from a physical state si to another state sj
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and F (si) is either undefined or F (sj) does not follow F (si) at the abstract level of
processing instructional information (where the function F maps sd to the physical
state realizing them). For example, if some noise causes a flip-flop to enter an
undefined state, the flip-flop miscomputes. In memoryless computational systems, a
miscomputation occurs when a particular capacity is actualized where it would not
have otherwise been actualized in the absence of noise.
The possibility of miscomputation reveals the elusive aspect of purposefulness in
both trivial and nontrivial computational systems. An artificial computational system
may be said to act for a purpose according to its design. When it fails to accomplish
the purpose for which it was designed, a miscomputation can be identified (removedfor-anonymity-1

forthcoming-b).

An

important

distinction

for

analyzing

purposefulness is between internal and external teleology. Objects that have some
immanent property that makes them goal-directed can be said to be internally
teleological. If an object has some goal assigned to it by some goal-conceiving agent,
then it is externally teleological (Mahner and Bunge 1997, 368). Accordingly, an
artificial computational system can have an externally assigned purpose, which is,
arguably, key for identifying the function(s) it computes. A natural computational
system, on the other hand, can only plausibly have a purpose for the system itself, that
is, it is internally teleological.
Yet, the claim that purposefulness is necessary for classifying a system as
computational is problematic. Consider a computer-illiterate monkey that is provided
with components, such as transistors and diodes, that are needed for building twoinput, one-output Boolean gates. Suppose that the monkey accidentally ends up
constructing an OR-gate (ORmon) that is a physical duplicate of an OR-gate
purposefully constructed by an engineer (OReng). Since OReng was constructed
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purposefully, it may be classified as computational. Yet, ORmon, which was not
constructed according to some purposeful design, cannot be classified as
computational. This leads to an absurd consequence where only one of the two ORgates may qualify as being computational, despite them being physical duplicates. A
detailed analysis of purposefulness must await another forum. But suffice it to say that
the appeal to purpose in determining what function is being computed by a given
system is epistemological, insofar that it is enforced by our explanatory goals, rather
than metaphysical in nature (Matthews 2011).
According to the fifth criterion, computational taxonomy, different classes of
computational systems have different capacities. Our taxonomy assumes the truth of
the Church-Turing Thesis, which states that every effectively computable function is
computable by a TM. A general-purpose TM can simulate any specific-purpose TM,
thereby being able to compute any partially recursive (Turing-computable) function.
Extant formalisms of computability (e.g., Kleene’s formal systems model, Gödel’s
recursive functions model, Church’s lambda calculus and Post’s machines) are all
Turing-equivalent. Whether this extensional equivalence suffices for computation
simpliciter remains contentious (removed-for-anonymity-1 2013). Any problem that
cannot be solved by a TM, given the Church-Turing thesis, presents a limit to what
can be accomplished by any form of machine that works in accordance with effective
methods. It remains an open empirical question whether there are in fact deterministic
physical processes that cannot be simulated by a TM (Copeland 2004, 15).
Computational complexity is accounted for in two ways, the richness of the
memory model and the richness of the capacities for actualizing instructional
information. We have shown above how memoryless trivial computational systems,
which need not actualize instructional information, gain more computational power
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when their input D are structured. The next step up in computational complexity is
memoryless nontrivial computation. Systems in that category lack memory but have
more than one capacity (enabled by the corresponding imperative instructions) and
process instructional information.
The next step up is memory-based nontrivial computation. Even though the FSA
and TM can be built on the same memory model, an FSA has more restrictions on
capacities than a TM, therefore, the latter is more computationally powerful than the
former. It is worth emphasizing that it is not simply the number of internal states that
determines the computational power of a TM. A general-purpose TM using just seven
states and four symbols can simulate any specific-purpose TM, even if the latter has
more states (Neary and Woods 2012). The RG of a general-purpose TM is much
richer than the RG of the specific-purpose TM that it is simulating. This example
demonstrates that computational systems with richer capacity sets (edges in the RG)
are computationally more powerful for the same underlying memory model.

7. Conclusion
Before concluding we make a few conjectures regarding the applicability of the IIP
account to other information processing systems. The most plausible conjecture is that
some discrete connectionist networks qualify as nontrivial computational systems,
whilst others qualify as trivial computational systems. As observed above, some
connectionist networks change their persistent state(s) during the course of
computation and others do not. Moreover, some networks that have only a single
capacity, say, to perform a linear summation of n neural inputs, do not need to process
instructional information. We discuss this at length elsewhere (removed-foranonymity unpublished).
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A second less obvious conjecture is the possible applicability of some version of
the IIP account to biological information processing systems. Many biologists hold
that the causal role of genes should be understood in terms of their carrying
information about their various products. Genes carry a message that is supposed to
be expressed even if that message is not actually expressed (Godfrey-Smith 2008).
Genes and only genes code the amino acid sequences of protein molecules. This
informational property is only applicable to the amino acid sequence (Godfrey-Smith
and Sterelny 2008). If genes carry messages that have imperative, rather than
descriptive, contents, then “instructional information” seems applicable. However, we
note that, at the very least, unlike the case of digital computation, the input and output
D differ in their nature. The outputs are amino acids, which are the building blocks of
protein molecules, whilst the input is the raw material in the cell. A thorough analysis
of the memory model of genes will facilitate the application of the IIP account to
biological systems.
The last conjecture, which certainly seems the most contentious one, is the possible
applicability of (a modified version of) the IIP account to natural cognitive systems.
We emphasize that in the case of conventional digital computation the driving force
behind the computational process is instructional information. However, natural
cognitive systems also process semantic contents that are descriptive and contingently
either true or false. Human cognitive agents experience and inhabit the world as a
semantic reality and interact informationally with their environments and other agents
through their bodily interfaces (Floridi forthcoming). Whether our actions are guided
by knowledge (where the underlying data are truthful) or just beliefs (where the
underlying data may be false), the information in question is descriptive rather than
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prescriptive. The IIP account does not preclude the possibility that the processed D be
descriptive information.
It is our contention that the IIP account is adequate for the explanation of digital
computation. First, it is compatible with the common intuition that digital
computation is a type of information processing. Second, unlike accounts that reduce
digital computation to symbolic computation and exclude paradigmatic computational
systems, the IIP account has the right scope. Moreover, it applies equally well to
abstract systems, such as TMs and FSAs, and physical systems, such as flip-flops,
ALUs and conventional digital computers. Third, whilst the IIP account classifies any
system that executes a program (in the sense used in computer science) as
computational, it is not restricted to this type of computational systems.
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